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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has been ambivalent in its attitude toward the
United Nations and toward human rights in particular. On the one hand
United States legal experts have been instrumental in helping to craft the
United Nations Covenants and Conventions. On the other, the Senate did
not give its advice and consent to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide until 1986, nearly thirty-seven years
after it was first submitted by President Truman.
The role of non-governmental organizations (N.G.O.s) has been
essential in the development and implementation of international human
rights law. In the United States, the N.G.O. community has provided
legal expertise to both the Department of State and Congress, has lobbied
Capitol Hill, and has developed a nationwide constituency for ratification
of the various human rights treaties.
In 1984, a Washington-based Human Rights Treaty Ratification
Working Group (hereinafter "Working Group") was formed to pursue
ratification of the United Nations human rights treaties. The Working
Group was composed of representatives of N.G.O.s from the legal, human
rights, and religious communities, including the American Bar
Association, Amnesty International U.S.A., B'nai Brith International, the
* Bahd'is of the United States; Organization listed for purposes of identification only.
This article is based on a presentation given at a panel discussion entitled U.S. Ratification of
Hwnan Rights Treaties at the International Law Weekend '96, sponsored by the American Branch
of the International Law Association, November 1, 1996, in New York City. The author wishes
to thank Ms. Patricia Rengel, Chief Legal Counsel of Amnesty International U.S.A., and Ms. Kit
Cosby, Deputy Director for External Affairs of the National Spiritual Assembly of the BahA'is of
the United States for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
International Human Rights Law Group, United Nations Association of the
United States, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the Bahd'is of the
United States, the Lutheran Office, and others. Over the years additional
working groups that focused on specific treaties were formed. These
treaties included the conventions on genocide, torture, race, children, and
women, as well as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
This paper will focus on the experience of the Washington, D.C.
human rights community. Other human rights coalitions based in New
York, the West coast, and the Midwest have also played an essential role
in the ratification of human rights treaties. While it is beyond the scope of
this paper to provide a comprehensive overview of the N.G.O. efforts to
promote ratification during the past decade, the general political strategy of
the Working Group will be summarized with examples of decisions and
action taken to illustrate each point.
A. Political strategy
The political strategy of the Human Rights Treaty Ratification Working
Group may be summarized as follows:
1) Lobby for ratification of at least one treaty during
each Congress.
2) Start with those treaties narrowest in scope and
establish broad bipartisan support thereby building
momentum for each subsequent treaty.
3) Push for ratification with a minimum of limiting
reservations, declarations and understandings.
4) Work closely with allies in Congress and the
Executive Branch to accomplish ratification and appeal to
popular support when necessary.
5) Support passage of implementation legislation
when necessary.
1. Lobby for Ratification of at Least One Treaty During Each
Congress
The Carter Administration made human rights the center of its
foreign policy. In 1978 the Administration submitted four human rights
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treaties' to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in 1980 it
submitted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. Following the 1980 election of President
Reagan, the treaties remained in Committee without further consideration.
In retrospect, the action taken by the Carter Administration appeared to be
a gesture with no strategy behind it.
In 1984, after consultation with the Legal Advisor's Office in the
State Department and with key members of Congress, the Working Group
agreed upon the goal of seeking ratification of at least one human rights
treaty during each Congress. Allies in Congress warned that the Senate
would consider only one human rights treaty at a time. Treaty supporters
also felt that if more than one treaty at a time were submitted, the
opponents of any one treaty could stop the others that were tied to it. The
members of the Working Group recognized that it was engaged in a long-
term education process in both the Congress and throughout the nation.
2. Start with Those Treaties Narrowest in Scope and Establish
Broad Bipartisan Support Thereby Building Momentum for Each
Subsequent Treaty
There is a creative tension between the demands and expectations
of the Executive Branch, Congress and of N.G.O.s. Depending on the
season, electoral politics, domestic politics, and the politics of the
international community all come into play.
The Genocide Convention was the first human rights treaty to be
considered for ratification. Because it was the first human rights treaty
submitted to the Senate in 1948 by President Truman and because the
treaty narrowly addressed only the issue of genocide, the subject elicited
universal condemnation and generated little domestic opposition. During
the presidential election campaign of 1984, President Ronald Reagan
announced his support for ratification of the Genocide Convention at the
National Convention of B'nai B'rith International. The timing and
conception- of his statement of support were not coincidental as the
American Bar Association, Amnesty International U.S.A., and B'nai
B'rith International had recommended that he take such action. Senator
William Proxmire submitted statements into the Congressional Record
every day for years calling for United States ratification of the Genocide
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Covenant on Economic, Social
& Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 5 I.L.M.
352 (1966); American Convention on Human Rights, 9 I.L.M. 99 (1970).
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Convention. In this instance the Working Group worked closely with
Senator Proxmire's office as well as with key members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to ensure the Senate's advice and consent of
the Treaty.
Of special significance at the time was the fact that following the
Republican takeover of the leadership of the Senate in 1984, Senator
Richard Lugar, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
persuaded a majority of Republicans to support the Convention while
ensuring the continued support of Democratic Senators. In addition, the
Working Group coordinated constituent visits with key members of the
Senate, including Senator Symms in Idaho, Senator Thurmond in South
Carolina, and Senator Hecht in Nevada, to urge them to vote for the
Convention on its own merits and not against it out of an exaggerated
concern for national sovereignty. As a result, in November 1988, almost
forty years after the United States had signed the Genocide Convention,
President Reagan signed implementing legislation thus completing the
process of ratification.
Having opened the door to the ratification process, the Reagan
Administration proposed for Senate consideration the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, or
Punishment which the Bush Administration subsequently brought to the
Senate for its advice and consent in October 1990. Subsequent treaties
brought before the Senate by the Bush and Clinton Administrations
included the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
3. Push for Ratification with a Minimum of Limiting Reservations,
Declarations or Understandings
Political considerations have had a profound influence not only on
the timing and order of treaties to be considered by the Senate but also on
the package legal provisions proposed by the State Department for each of
the treaties. In principle, the members of the Working Group agreed that
the human rights treaties could be ratified by the United States with a
minimum of limiting legal provisions. Each organization had to decide for
itself what legal issues were amenable to compromise. While the Working
Group recognized that compromises would have to be made with the State
Department and the Senate on legal issues of concern to get the ratification
process started with the Genocide Convention, the overall strategy was to
decrease the impact of limiting legal provisions negotiated for each
subsequent human rights treaty.
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For example, Senator Jesse Helms had insisted that a reservation
on national sovereignty be attached to the Genocide Convention. The
reservation stated "[n]othing in the Convention requires or authorizes
legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by
the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States."
Many members of the Working Group found this reservation
objectionable and unnecessary. The Working Group agreed, however,
that it was not worth stalling the momentum for ratification by insisting
that the reservation be taken out and thus perhaps delaying indefinitely the
proceedings. Subsequently, the Working Group cited the negative reaction
of other governments against the sovereignty reservation in insisting that
the reservation should not be included in the legal package negotiated for
the Convention Against Torture.
Although Senator Jesse Helms, ranking Minority Leader of the
Foreign Relations Committee, strongly favored the inclusion of the
sovereignty reservation in the instrument of ratification for the Convention
on Torture, a bipartisan compromise was subsequently reached to reduce
the sovereignty reservation to that of a proviso to be sent to all state parties
which stated that "no legislation or action is required that is prohibited by
the U.S. Constitution." Significantly, the proviso was not included with
the instrument of ratification deposited by the President at the United
Nations. Similar provisos were sent upon ratification of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in 1992 and the Convention on the Elimination
for All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1994.
Modification in the language of other provisions has occurred over
the history of the ratification of human rights treaties. For example, the
federal-state reservation under the Convention Against Torture has become
an understanding under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Race Convention. However, the United States continued to take a
reservation on the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under the Race Convention as it had under the Genocide
Convention. In addition, the Conventions on torture and race, and the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights each had understandings stating the
treaties were not self-executing.2
In the package submitted by the Clinton Administration to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the Women's Convention in
October 1994, the reservation on the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice taken under the conventions on genocide and
race has been reduced to a declaration. The freedom of speech reservation
2. Krr COSBY, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (Nov.
1994).
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taken under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Race
Convention has been proposed as an understanding.
There is also a creative tension within the N.G.O. community in
the negotiation of political strategy and legal policy. Clearly, the active
members of the Working Group were all committed to the overall goal of
ratification. Some organizations have wanted to use the treaties to
condemn the government's domestic record while others felt it more politic
to emphasize the international influence the treaties would have in
establishing basic universal human rights standards at home and abroad.
Each organization had to decide what it could live with and what it could
not when it came to consulting with the State Department on the United
States package of provisions for each treaty. Some organizations such as
the Bahl'is of the United States upheld ratification of the treaties in support
of the general principle of the rule of law without taking legal positions on
the specific provisions of the treaties. In this regard the Bahd'is could help
facilitate a consensus on issues where various organizations differed.
Other organizations such as Amnesty International U.S.A., which
condemns the use of the death penalty under all circumstances, had to
decide when they could accept a compromise and when they had to
threaten to oppose ratification of a treaty all together because of a
proposed position of the government on a given treaty provision. On
many of these difficult issues, the American Bar Association was
instrumental in helping to hammer out a compromise solution acceptable to
all parties.
For example, in 1988 the Administration had proposed a
reservation for the Convention Against Torture that would have changed
the definition of torture by introducing specific defenses for torture.
Amnesty International U.S.A. decided that it would have to oppose
ratification unless this reservation were eliminated. In the fall of 1989,
following President Bush's election, Amnesty International's then Legal
Director, Nigel Rodley, a world expert on torture, met with the Legal
Advisor and staff of the State Department and members of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice. After the meeting, the
Administration created a new package for submittal to the Senate. On the
other hand, when the Administration proposed a reservation for the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that permitted capital punishment,
Amnesty International U.S.A. decided, after extensive debate, that they
would not oppose ratification on this issue, recognizing that Congress was
reluctant to resolve domestic controversies through the adoption of
international treaties under the Constitution.
Finally, limiting provisions for treaty ratification are not only a
source of controversy domestically, but internationally as well. A number
[Vol. 3:641
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of State Parties have submitted to the United Nations their objections to
United States provisions.
4. Work Closely with Allies in Congress and the Executive Branch
to Accomplish Ratification and Appeal to Popular Support When
Necessary
Over the years, national organizations with grassroots
constituencies have requested their membership to write or call relevant
members of Congress and the Administration in support of the ratification
of various human rights treaties. Letter writing campaigns have been
timed to urge the Administration to actively support ratification, to urge
the Senate to hold hearings or vote on a given treaty, or to request
sponsorship of congressional resolutions or letters that recommend such
action be taken.
The first two treaties on genocide and torture that were ratified by
the United States could not have been ratified without the support of key
national organizations such as the American Bar Association, Amnesty
International U.S.A., B'nai B'rith International, and others who lobbied on
Capitol Hill and provided essential legal expertise. Neither treaty had
great popular support. The same was true to a great extent for ratification
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The issues addressed by the remaining treaties, however,
particularly those dealing with children and women, and the Covenant on
Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, are not so clear cut precisely
because of the legacy of the Cold War and the opposition against the
social, economic, and cultural provisions in each of them. In addition,
many of the provisions of these treaties deal more directly with state law
than with just federal law.
In this instance, it has become necessary to build a grassroots
constituency for both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and for the
Women's Convention.
The role of the United Nations World Summits and Conferences
has been crucial in helping to develop such a constituency in the United
States, particularly the World Summit for Children in New York in 1990,
the Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993, and the World
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.
B. Convention on the Rights of the Child
Following the World Summit for Children in New York in 1990,
InterAction, the organization that took the lead in coordinating N.G.O.
support for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, developed a very
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effective legislative and grassroots campaign which included a National
Advisory Council on the Rights of the Child co-chaired by Senators
Bradley and Lugar. House and Senate resolutions were passed in the 10 1 st
Congress with eighty-five and sixty cosponsors respectively. Nine
governors and states issued proclamations or passed resolutions in support
of the Convention. Other resolutions were passed at the city and local
levels. Sign-on letters addressed to President Bush and the Congress from
corporate leaders and N.G.O.s were sent. Periodic letter writing
campaigns were initiated by the members of the Working Group on the
Rights of the Child. In Washington, the American Bar Association
sponsored a working group to do an analysis of the Convention and its
impact on United States domestic law.
Of all of the human rights treaties the Convention on the Rights of
the Child enjoyed the greatest widespread constituent popularity. It also
enjoyed the support of the First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton, formerly
affiliated with the Children's Defense Fund. On February 16, 1995,
United States United Nations Ambassador, Madelaine K. Albright, signed
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on behalf of the United States.
However, perhaps because of its relative popularity, the Convention also
inspired the most intense organized opposition by such groups as the
National Center for Home Education, the Eagle Forum, and the Family
Research Council. A second resolution in support of the Convention
which was to be introduced in the 10 4 ' Congress was stalled because of
the withdrawal of support from several senior senators such as Senator
Bob Dole. Several Senate offices reported that most constituent phone
calls and letters regarding the Rights of the Child treaty were
overwhelmingly negative.
C. Convention on Women
The United States signed the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women on July 17, 1980, and President
Carter transmitted it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
November 1980. The Committee held hearings on the Convention in the
101st and 10 3' Congresses. In the hearing held during the summer of
1990, the State Department, under the Bush administration, testified that it
had not yet prepared a legal analysis.
In the Spring of 1993, after intense lobbying by N.G.O.s, sixty-
eight senators signed a letter to President Clinton asking him to take the
necessary steps to ratify the Women's Convention. In June 1993,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced at the United Nations
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna that "[g]uaranteeing
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women their human rights is a moral imperative." In the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action the United States agreed that "[t]he
United Nations should encourage the goal of universal ratification by all
States of the [Women's] Convention by the year 2000." The United States
also announced its intention to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Significantly, the United States and the other nations represented at the
Conference agreed that human rights are "universal, indivisible and
interdependent and inter-related."
Administration officials had hoped that ratification of the
conventions on race and women would take place by the summer of 1994.
Following ratification of the Race Convention in June 1994, the Clinton
Administration submitted a package for the Women's Convention to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee which passed favorably on September
29th by a vote of thirteen-five (with one abstention). At the same time
there was an eleventh hour mail and phone campaign against the treaty,
fueled in part by radio talk shows. Several senators put a hold on the
Convention, thereby blocking it from the Senate floor during the 103'
Congress.
Following the fall 1994 elections, the Republicans took over the
leadership of Congress and Senator Jesse Helms became Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee. When the new Senate convened in January
1995, the Convention on Women reverted to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, where it remains to this day.
In September 1995, at the Fourth World Conference on Women in
Beijing, China, the United States reaffirmed the commitment to seek
ratification of the Women's Convention. With approximately 8,000
Americans attending the Conference, the Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action provided fresh momentum to build popular support for United
State ratification. After the Beijing Conference, the Washington D. C.
based Working Group on Ratification of the Women's Convention,
currently co-chaired by Amnesty International U.S.A. and the Bahi'is of
the United States, offered as a model an effort initiated in 1995 by the
Iowa Division of the United Nations Association. That effort resulted in
the Iowa City Council passing on August 1, 1995, a resolution endorsing
United State ratification of the Women's Convention. Since its passage,
four other Iowa municipality campaigns have been launched. Five state
legislatures, California, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York and South
Dakota, have also endorsed resolutions in support of ratification.
On April 30, 1996, over one hundred organizations signed a letter
addressed to all Senators urging that "the Senate give its prompt advice
and consent to ratify" the Convention.
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5. Support Passage of Implementation Legislation When Necessary
he process of ratification of human rights treaties does not end with
the advice and consent given by the Senate. States Parties are required to
undertake measures to adopt and give effect to treaty provisions, through
the implementation legislation if necessary, and to participate in the United
Nations system for monitoring compliance.
An issue of concern for nearly all human rights N.G.O.s is that to
date each of the human rights treaties has been ratified with the declaration
of non-self-execution. This means that provisions of the treaty may not be
enforced directly by the judiciary in the absence of implementing
legislation passed by both houses of Congress. Many object to this
declaration because it prevents United Nations treaties from becoming
United States law and United States citizens may not invoke treaty
provisions in United States courts unless implementation legislation has
been passed by Congress.3
The members of the Working Group recognized that there is great
reluctance on the part of Congress to change domestic law through treaty
law. The Constitution is the supreme law of land, and even though the
Constitution makes treaties the supreme law of the land as well, Congress
is reluctant to use the treaty process as a means of changing domestic law
because only the Senate is given the responsibility for advice and consent
to ratification. In contrast, implementation legislation requires the consent
of both houses of Congress.
Implementation legislation was required to make specific
provisions of the conventions on genocide and torture a part of the United
States legal code. For both treaties, the Working Group assisted the
relevant congressional committees in drafting the implementing legislation
and in helping to ensure that the legislation went through the ordinary
legislative process necessary for final passage by both houses of Congress.
Following the Senate's advice and consent of the Genocide
Convention in 1986, President Reagan signed, in November 1988, the
Genocide Convention Implementation Act,4 which made genocide a federal
crime, established penalties for commission of that crime, and defined the
jurisdiction of the United States over acts of genocide as referred to in
article V of the Convention. In June 1994, President Clinton signed the
State Department Authorization Bill which included legislation
implementing articles 10-14 and 16 of the Convention on Torture. In
November 1994, the instrument of ratification to the Convention on
3. Id.
4. Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. §1091 (1996).
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Torture was deposited at the United Nations after the proviso on national
sovereignty had been sent to all governments party to the convention.
In the fall of 1994, the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights led
an effort to introduce legislation that would make United States law the
provisions on which the United States took reservations under the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The International Human Rights
Law Group began an effort to introduce implementation legislation on the
Race Convention.5 The intent of the proposed legislation was to provide
United States citizens a cause of action in United States courts as provided
for by the relevant treaty provisions. They failed to find congressional co-
sponsors for both measures.
Once a convention is ratified, the United States is obliged to report
periodically its progress to responsible United Nations committees that
monitor compliance of each treaty. In March 1995, United States
representatives appeared before the Human Rights Committee, the treaty
monitoring body of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to answer
questions about the United States Government's initial report submitted to
the Committee in September 1994. Human rights organizations provided
information to the State Department for its preparation of that report and in
March 1995 made public an N.G.O. report which was also given to the
members of the Human Rights Committee. The purpose of the N.G.O.
report was to
assess the accuracy and completeness of the United States
Report; to identify the subject areas where the most serious
compliance problems exist that are not addressed
adequately in the U.S. Report; and help the U.S.
government and the United Nations agencies responsible
for monitoring human rights instruments develop more
effective methodology for assessing and reporting on
compliance status and needs on a regular basis.6
The human rights community has communicated with the State
Department officials responsible for preparing the reports required by the
conventions on race and torture. However, the United States has not met
the deadlines as required by the conventions. The human rights
5. COSBY, supra note 2.
6. Joint Working Group of Non-Governmental Civil, Political and Human Rights
Organizations in the United States, The Status of Human Rights in the United States: An Analysis
of the Initial U.S. Government Report to the Human Rights Committee Under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in SC. AND HUM. RTS. PROGRAM, AM. ASS'N FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCt. (Morton Scklar, ed., 1995).
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community also expects to prepare its own reports for each of these
treaties.
II. CONCLUSION
Support of the ratification of human rights treaties has been a
dynamic process which has required the cooperation of the executive and
legislative branches of government in collaboration with non-governmental
organizations. The role of the N.G.O. community has been essential in
generating popular support for human rights and in providing legal
expertise and applying political pressure to Congress and the Executive
Branch to accomplish ratification. While it appears that the anti-United
Nations sentiment in Congress has been tempered somewhat since the 104'
Congress adjourned, serious obstacles within the Senate must be overcome
before ratification of the remaining United Nations human rights treaties
can be achieved. These treaties include the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the
Rights of the Children, the American Convention on Human Rights, and
the Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. The challenge
before the N.G.O. community is to significantly increase the popular
support that already exists for the ratification of human rights treaties
through a nationwide grassroots education program while continuing to
press for prompt ratification on Capitol Hill.
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